Jr. and Barack Obama's election to the U.S. presidency add interest to recent work on racial justice that includes scholarship on King's legacy, and on white privilege's deleterious influences on theology and society. Beginning in 2006, falling U.S. real estate values and the collapse of the subprime mortgage market exposed an epidemic of overleveraging in financial credit markets. Faced with dramatic declines in collateral values and weakening ability to back their credit products, major financial institutions faltered. Many historically stable companies were forced to offer themselves for sale at bargain prices, petition for huge government bailouts, or declare bankruptcy. In autumn 2008, despite injections of funds by the United States and other countries, an enormous breakdown of trust in credit and markets swept through the global economy. The results have been described as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. At this writing, its cascading impacts on national, local, and household economies, most especially already poverty-stricken regions and families, were only beginning to be seen.
CHRISTIAN ETHICAL ANALYSIS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Christian economic-ethical inquiry is a complex activity with intellectual as well as practical and sapiential aspirations.
7 It navigates fundamental questions concerning theological and moral anthropology; the impact of finitude and sin (along with grace) upon economic relations (and upon scholarly attempts to decipher and evaluate these relations); and the demands of human dignity and solidarity. In addressing economic problems, ethicists must adjudicate among competing economic, ethical, and theological theories and opinions and draw from these sources coherent, religiously-warranted moral arguments-taking account of the influence of ideology, social location, and power on which voices and whose concerns are privileged, and which are muted or marginalized in their sources and in their own work.
8
The modern Roman Catholic social tradition addresses both perennial issues and the "new things" that mark a rapidly changing, global economy. The dynamics and dysfunctions of 21st-century financial markets, however unprecedented or recondite, thus fall firmly within the Church's analytic and evaluative purview. The 2004 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church acknowledges globalization's achievements and potential, but also warns of the threats to human well-being (no. 362) of an economy in which financial markets have become "ever more decisive and central" (no. 361). As the ensuing remarks (nos. 362-76) show, a normative understanding of economy's purpose-namely, to serve human dignity and material well-being-and a set of principles grounded in this purpose orient Catholic ethical analyses of contemporary finance. 9 First, a principle of intelligibility affirms that social and economic processes and structures are subject to human comprehension. Ethical analysis thus begins by seeking an accurate understanding of financial markets, how they work, and what has gone awry. This descriptive work requires critical familiarity with pertinent economic theories, concepts, and debates.
10
The recent market crisis can be traced to financiers' turning to the booming mortgage market in their efforts develop high-yield, stable-risk investment products to offer to "the giant pool of money," more precisely, the fixed securities market, which grew at unprecedented speed after 2000. In response to intense demand, there was an explosion of new financial instruments known as "over-the-counter credit derivatives."
11 Two credit derivative products, funded "collateralized debt obligations" (CDOs) and unfunded "credit default swaps" (CDSs), were central in the lead-up to the 2008 crisis.
A collateralized debt obligation is built from a mortgage-backed security, which is a pool or bundle of mortgages. That bundle is cut into slices. Depending on the quality of the mortgage pools they are cut from, slices 11 "The birth of credit derivatives can be traced back to two major market developments: the packing of US mortgage bonds in the 1980s to create collateralised debt obligations and the selling of default protection in the 1990s as credit default swaps to trade credit risk. Over the past decade, the credit derivatives market has grown at a breathtaking speed. When the most basic form of credit derivatives, credit default swaps (CDS), first emerged in the US in the early 1990s, they were used principally by banks as proprietary instruments to hedge their loan exposure. By . . . the latter part of the decade . . . credit derivatives were working their way into the mainstream of the financial market. . . . Within no time, credit default swaps were being used to build increasingly complicated derivatives of their own" (Attwood, "Credit Derivatives").
("tranches") are deemed higher or lower risk. Regularly, higher and lowerrisk slices were pooled and sliced again. Credit rating agencies, using complex predictive computer modeling, frequently gave the top (and even middle) slices of these pools credit ratings of AAA: low risk-as "good as money."
12
Credit default swaps, introduced in the 1990s, are, at their simplest, contracts between a credit protection seller and a credit protection buyer. "The seller agrees to pay out sums by reference to a single or group of reference entities," such as a CDO. "The buyer buys a pre-agreed amount of credit protection on a reference entity's obligations. . . . The seller sells credit protection against the loss in value of the reference entity's obligations if certain events occur [such as bankruptcy or default]." But unlike buying insurance on, say, one's own house, in a default swap, "the reference entity [the item being insured] is not a party to the transaction and is probably unaware of its existence," making such swaps essentially "sidebets on the future performance of the U.S. mortgage markets and major financial institutions."
13 CDSs in various forms quickly morphed into a highly profitable market. By 2007, backing nearly $62 trillion (compared to the $1.3 trillion subprime market), the CDS market had become grossly overleveraged as credit defaults were traded by speculators for up to 100 times the value of the bonds those policies insured.
14 By 2003, with housing prices continuing to rise, the appetite for CDOs and CDO-referenced swap products unabated, and huge profits to be made by those who could supply this market, two things happened: Guidelines for mortgage-granting went on a steep slide 15 (the nadir was likely 12 Credit rating agencies hired to calculate risk levels were pressed for positive ratings on products their clients were anxious to sell, making computer models that judged risk-ridden bundles as "money good" therefore less likely to be questioned. 13 mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=3517&nid=6. "Overleverage" refers to "a balance sheet condition where the entity is incapable of servicing its debt load (interest payments) with available capital resources. Simply put, the entity is carrying too much debt" (Financial Dictionary [2008] ), http://www.financial-dictionary.com; also Jeff Madura, Financial Markets and Institutions 160-61, 728.
15 Mortgage guidelines were relaxed in the 1990s, partly due to well-intentioned efforts to make home ownership possible for more Americans. But by 2007, adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) accounted for 30% of all mortgages, and for 75% "no income no asset" mortgages) greatly increasing the number of subprime mortgages. Meanwhile, midsize mortgage companies borrowed from larger banks at increasingly leveraged rates to get the funds to buy loan pools that they, in turn, sold to Wall Street, which sold them again, repackaged, frequently into the international markets. Minimal regulation 16 enabled financial institutions to sell these products widely, as high-risk loans were sliced, diced, and resold in mixed-basket products.
Derivative markets spread risk around and protected against risks associated with localized housing crises.
17 But unprecedented levels of highrisk, low-transparency trading injected crisscrossing veins of uncertainty into local and international markets. To the extent that these veins harbored "bad risk," markets became networks of "interlocking fragility." 18 Experienced managers, distracted by a combination of huge potential profits, sophisticated computer models purporting to confirm the AAA status of complicated loan bundles, and the belief that spreading diversified products out in the world securities market would somehow protect everyone from the consequences of defaults, overrode their own hesitations.
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By 2006, these weaknesses honeycombed the financial system. Then, falling U.S. property values set off a chain reaction. Foreclosures rose, the instability of derivatives markets was exposed, and confidence in the creditworthiness of even venerable financial institutions was severely undermined. Between 2007 and 2008, the subprime mortgage market crisis ballooned into a full-blown credit and liquidity crisis. The tissue of trust on which markets always depend thinned dangerously.
A principle of agency and accountability insists that economic markets are not weather-like processes, but complex sets of relationships that are of subprime mortgages. As ARMs continue to reset at higher rates (in 2009 60% of ARMS made since 2004 were to increase by 25% or more, and 25% by 50% or more), defaults are rising precipitously. produced and affected by human agency. To work at optimum efficiency for the common good, markets require structurally-attuned, political buffering in the form of effective norms, rules and oversight, and practitioners who exhibit "business virtue" by cooperating responsibly with both the letter and spirit of pertinent norms and regulations.
Debates about the credit crisis often betray disagreements about de facto or de jure limits of agency in economic processes. 20 Extrapolating the Smithian metaphor of the "invisible hand," some hold that financial markets cannot be controlled. Others contend that markets ought not be interfered with. "It is easy to believe that the processes of global economy are beyond our control. . . . Both those on the political right and the left tend to encourage such a view, the right emphasizing the invisible hand of the free market that benefits all and the left emphasizing a handful of elites who run the capitalist machine that exploits the masses."
21 Certain economists admit degrees of agency and accountability but argue that traditional ethical categories, which focus on personal ethics, must be adapted to the impersonal and competitive features of complex market relations.
22 And business ethicists have debated the extent to which competitive market relations operate by a game-like code wherein participants, expecting one another to bluff, feint and maneuver to gain the most profitable advantage for their respective stakeholders. Hindsight suggests multiple failures of accountability and business virtue in the buildup to the 2008 credit crisis. First, many agents recognized the dangers of extending huge credit lines to poor-risk homebuyers and of overleveraging credit at multiple levels, but the pressure of demand and the enticement of high rewards for supplying that demand overruled prudence. This bred collusion between irresponsible borrowers (including individual home-buyers and investors) and irresponsible lenders. Second, highly complex and varied derivative products and contracts diminished buyers' and sellers' ability to make well-informed decisions about price and risk. Third, the temptation to take advantage of these markets was great, because the short-term payoffs were high, the risk appeared low, and external regulation or oversight was limited or absent. Fourth, even when evidence mounted that a proliferating derivative market based on securities whose collateral was contaminated by poorly backed loans in a thinning housing bubble threatened the whole credit system, an ethos of "everyone is doing it," combined with rationalizing technical maneuvers (including offbalance sheet accounting techniques, the use of credit rating agencies with conflicts of interest, and computer models that predicted security for commonsensically foolish levels of risk) deterred most from shifting course.
As Arjun Appadurai observes, this perfect financial storm required "arcane changes in the rules of accounting which allowed banks to disguise totally unspecified uncertainties as calculable (and profitable) risks; it required remarkable suspension of the elementary rules of government oversight over financial institutions; and it required a society that did not mind living with awesome amounts of debt at every level of its functioning." Many relevant participants did not fully understand "what derivatives were or how they worked, and each one hoped that they would be sitting on a secure chair . . . when the music stopped. The music stopped because of the housing market . . . but the game which stopped was a much larger faith-based system based on the radical replacement of risk by uncertainty. Auerback identifies this infiltration of markets by genuine uncertainty, rather than calculable risk, as a primary factor in the recent credit implosion.
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A third, incarnational principle refuses to deracinate social and economic relations from their embodied, material bases and consequences, and demands that economic processes, however complex, remain anchored in and accountable to the situations and needs of the embodied persons, local communities, and particular cultures from whom they spring, on whom they depend, and whose welfare they influence. 26 Thus official teaching cautions concerning global financial markets' increasingly abstract contours and self-referential workings: "A financial economy that is an end unto itself is destined to contradict its goals, since it is no longer in touch with its roots and has lost sight of its constitutive purpose . . . [and] essential role of serving the real economy, and, ultimately, of contributing to the development of people and the human community." 27 This criticism is especially pertinent to the speculative distention of financial markets over the past decade. 28 Honoring the incarnational principle also requires that concrete impacts of large-scale economic dynamics on local communities, workers, and their families be given careful attention. 29 25 "The key distinction . . . is that while 'risk' can to some extent be priced by financial market participants, 'uncertainty' cannot. The failure to distinguish between the two concepts is one reason the seizure of the credit system has been so rapid and has caught everybody off-guard . . . . Pricing opacity . . . is mirrored by a lack of statistical transparency, which breeds even greater uncertainty." Marshall Auerback, "Risk vs. Uncertainty: The Cause of the Current Financial Crisis," Japan Policy Research Institute Occasional Paper no. 37 (October 2007) 5-6, http://www. jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op37.html. 26 Thus, e.g., "a major lesson in the reform of financial institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa is the realisation that financial sector liberalization that fails to take the socioeconomic setting of the region into consideration, will not achieve its objectives" (Peter Gakunu, "Reforming the Financial System in Sub-Saharan Africa: The [Long] A principle of subsidiarity calls for dispersing power in economic relations, locating decision-making authority at local levels wherever possible, and resisting power's usurpation by governments, corporations, or any body lacking accountability to the communities it affects.
30 While accepting ordered asymmetries of power, subsidiarity's norm of subsiduum, (mutual assistance) requires "higher" levels of organization such as the state to ensure the conditions whereby power and authority can be appropriately exercised at local and grassroots levels. 31 Power's tendency to clot and concentrate suggests that global financial markets require oversight mechanisms devoted to ensuring that economic and social power circulates to the grassroots. Subsidiarity, then, both reflects an incarnational appreciation for local sites of economic agency (such as states, communities, and families), and points to the need for international collaboration in formulating, and continually updating, regulations designed to keep global markets connected to the common good.
The extent to which such dispersion of power is fostered by the capitalist economy in its currently dominant form is debated both within and outside religious ranks. 32 Globalization theorists like Ulrich Beck and Arjun Appadurai critique a hegemonic rhetoric of "faith in the market system" and a fervor for its preservation reminiscent of religious piety. In the postCold War era, they suggest, market capitalism has sought to position itself as the "one, true, catholic" economic faith.
Beck criticizes a neoliberal agenda that has attempted to "generalize from the short-lived historic victories of mobile capital." In an ideology that frames markets as "absolute and autonomous," "what is best for capital becomes the best option for everyone." Unless sufficiently buffered, transnational capital trumps any less-powerful interests. In current circumstances, "the power of this new liberalism rests on a radical inequality; not just anyone is permitted to flaunt the rules. The breaking or changing of rules remains the revolutionary prerogative of capital." Corporate and financial institutions' tendency to clamor in hard times for government intervention that in good times they would vigorously resist reflects a proclivity for privatizing market success and socializing market failure that illustrates Beck's claim. To effectively counterweight transnational capital's clout and protect subsidiarity will require nations to build multilateral regional or global unions invested with real political power. 33 Finally, and crucially, the combined principles of solidarity and preferential option for the most vulnerable yoke an embrace of the mutual obligations entailed by human interdependence within a shared natural and social environment, with a priority commitment to including and empowering those whom current economic arrangements oppress, exploit, or marginalize. 34 The 2008 financial meltdown brought home the inescapable connectedness-de facto solidarity-of a globalized economy. One commentator compared citizens protesting the U.S. government's $700 billion bailout of financial markets to people on one side of a sinking ship crying, "We did our duty; our side is fine; just let the irresponsible folk on that other side go down!" 35 But forging policies and practices that infuse this simultaneously global and localized ("glocal") economic web 36 with an intentional solidarity aimed at democratizing power in pursuit of an ecologically sustainable, economic common good is a radical goal that supersedes anything the United Nations' "social development" approach to globalization-a model largely embraced by official Catholic teachinghas attempted to date. 37 With the collapse of the speculative bubble, Appadurai observes, "as usual, vulnerable nations, communities and persons are the most exposed." 38 Over the past decade trade and debt disparities between richer and poorer nations increased; within developed nations involved in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), conditions for those with less deteriorated while the benefits of growth augmented the incomes of the affluent.
39 Absent targeted, sustained strategies for ensuring inclusive solidarity, financial remedies and assistance will flow toward alreadyprivileged corporations or regions. Some concerns will be deemed "too big-or important-to fail," others as too small or too weak to matter. To advance inclusive economic solidarity will require intelligent scholarship, creative leadership and concerted, sacrificial effort by individuals and communities. Solidarity makes special demands on Catholic scholars, institutions, and citizens, demands we ignore or minimize to our moral and spiritual peril.
In bringing these principles to bear on current economic difficulties, Christian ethicists must address complex and contested questions concerning: (a) (personal, cultural, institutional) are needed to ensure that markets better serve persons' economic well-being, understood through the lens of solidarity and the preferential option for the poor? How are these changes to be infused into individual, local, and macroeconomic practices? 40 The Catholic moral tradition regards work, business, trade, the pursuit, investment, and distribution of wealth, and their supporting virtues (diligence, entrepreneurial creativity, organization, leadership, efficiency, contractual honesty, etc.) as instrumental to economy's threefold human end: the material survival and flourishing of all community members (in a global marketplace, that community extends dramatically); the development and use of participants' abilities; and the promotion of the common good-all for the greater glory of God. 41 Public deliberations over economic diagnoses and policies need robust Catholic ethical voices that provide intelligent and value-sensitive analyses of the circumstances at hand and the stakes involved-especially for the vulnerable; agentially-and structurally-astute evaluations of what works and what does not; and theologically grounded, publicly persuasive rationales for action plans that can direct markets toward solidary, sustainable ends.
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RESOURCES FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
The economic-ethical agenda suggested by this discussion is urgent, manifold, and barely begun. I close by flagging three promising loci for further scholarly and practical work.
Bernard Lonergan and Economic Ethics
The ethical and economic writings of Bernard Lonergan harbor potent resources for addressing the pitfalls and potentials of 21st-century markets. 44 Stephen L. Martin's lucid 2008 volume introduces Lonergan's economic theory and situates it in relation to Catholic social thought and liberal and liberationist economics. 45 In Lonergan's economics manuscripts, which complement more foundational epistemological and ethical writings, Kenneth Melchin detects one major idea "screaming out": "a market is not a mechanism that directs the economy so much as it is a pipeline through which human decisions can direct the economy."
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For Lonergan, when decisions within different economic sectors are informed by accurate insights into the unfolding dialectical relationships involved, a pattern of responsible decisions can yield a "cycle of growth." Economic decisions oriented toward value (that is, decisions that integrate legitimate concerns for self-interest and efficiency into economy's normative purposes) "impart the appropriate nudges and nuances into the economy" and hedge economic relations against "a longer cycle of decline." Decline is "a dynamic that builds on itself, yielding conditions that seem more and more opaque and impenetrable to understanding, much less to repair." Without an adequate understanding of economic agents and dynamics, efforts to repair things may "accelerate decline precisely at the moment when a potential for growth could be coming into play, if decision-making were appropriately informed." One culprit in decline is a selfperpetuating "general bias of common sense," which, "in its refusal of adequate theory, progressively builds into the empirical situation corresponding deformations that accelerate as they become the experiential basis for the next round of insights."
47 Paraphrasing Lonergan's biases as, "neurosis, egoism, loyalism, and anti-intellectualism," Tad Dunne adds that, in each type, "one's intelligence is selectively suppressed and one's self-image is supported by positive affects that reinforce the bias and by negative affects toward threats to the bias." 48 For describing recent market events, these Lonerganian concepts seem strikingly apt. Over the past decade, decision-making that failed to incorporate pursuit of value (rather than merely self-interest or of "what works" in the short run) compounded oversights and bred bias. As financial institutions (from CEOs to consumers) retreated from a culture of prudence and transparently calculated risk, 49 an egregious example of the cycle of decline unfolded. Interest overcame intelligence and value as home-buyers and investors gambled on overleveraged debts, proceeding on, at best, implausible assumptions that housing prices would never stop rising, and that the rot of bad debt could be hedged by ingenious financial instruments that would protect everyone from major exposure. In a time-and profitpressured atmosphere, stupidity, denial, and self-interest fed on one another as persons at every point on the chain failed to ask, or pursue, further relevant questions. As scholars and practitioners work to unravel the snarls besetting financial markets, Lonergan's thought may prove freshly illuminating.
Alternative Streams in Economic Theory
Given their historical interconnections, it is surprising that so few contemporary Catholic economic ethicists (Daniel Finn is the notable exception) draw seriously on the scholarship of social economics. 51 Economists in the Association of Social Economics, along with its journal, Review of Social Economy, comprise a wealth of resources for Christian ethicists studying economy and finance. Recent themed issues of Review of Social Economy address such topics as social capital, the economic subject in modern and postmodern economics, 52 and living standards and social wellbeing. 53 Other sites of norm-sensitive economic scholarship are the fields of behavioral and institutional economics (or New Institutional Economics-NIE). Some see these approaches as moving the neoclassical mainstream of the field toward revision, even paradigm shift. 54 Finally, a growing cohort of feminist economists are producing works attuned to women's varied economic contributions, concerns, and well-being. 55 
Finance Ethics and Ethics Education
Also inviting further engagement is the still-nascent field of finance ethics and ethics education. Inroads to date include (1) the 1997 book by
